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In the field of compensation of non-pecuniary damage, one of the most widely discussed
issues is whether and based on which prerequisites those close to a person killed or in-
jured ought to be able to claim compensation for non-pecuniary damage. This article
attempts to find answers to these questions by comparing Estonian, German and English
law as well as relevant European model laws. The article thoroughly examines Estonian
case-law and investigates whether Estonian courts have reasonably substantiated the
precondition for a claim for compensation of non-pecuniary damage of a close person
under Estonian law, i.e. the occurrence of exceptional circumstances. The article shows the
actual possibilities of a person close to the deceased or to an aggrieved person to obtain
compensation for non-pecuniary damage under Estonian law.
& 2016. Mykolas Romeris University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All right
reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Non-pecuniary damage can be characterised as harm
that, unlike pecuniary damage, does not lead to a decrease
in property. Non-pecuniary damage cannot be measured in
money or assessed in economic categories (Koziol, 2012, p.
113).
Although, in general, compensation of non-pecuniary
damage can be demanded, above all, by a person whose
legal right has been harmed, it is in principle possible that
a person close to the one whose life or health has been
harmed becomes entitled to such a claim. Under the Ar-
ticle 134 (3) of the Estonian Law of Obligations Act (LOA,
2002),3 in the case of an obligation to compensate damageuction and hosting by Else
/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
he Estonian Science
eris University
e.kull@ut.ee (I. Kull).
1, entry into forcearising from the death of a person or a serious personal
injury or health damage caused to the person, persons
close to the deceased or the aggrieved person may also
claim compensation for non-pecuniary damage if payment
of such compensation is justified by exceptional
circumstances.
This article seeks an answer to the question of whether
a person close to the deceased or aggrieved person4 ought
to have a claim for the compensation of non-pecuniary
damage against the tortfeasor. If the answer to the ques-
tion is affirmative, we immediately come to the question of
what the specific prerequisites are for such a claim by a
close person. It has been argued that this is by no meansvier B.V. All right reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
(footnote continued)
01.07.2002. Available in English at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/
526082015004/consolide. Estonian laws are available in English at
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/.
4 In this article, the person whose death or bodily injury results in a
claim by a person close to the deceased or injured person for compen-
sation of non-pecuniary damage is also called the victim.
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Emaus, 2014, p. 92).
This article was inspired by the fact that a lively debate
arose in Estonian society and the media over the Article
134 (3) of the LOA in 2011 and 2012, which is rather
unusual for matters of compensation of damage. This de-
bate was sparked by a case where a person who did not
have the right to drive a vehicle unsupervised caused a
traffic accident that resulted in the death of, among others,
both parents of the claimant. The claimant sought the
compensation of non-pecuniary damage by the person
who caused the traffic accident, but the court dismissed
the claim. The final outcome of the case seemed to conflict
with society's sense of justice not so much because the
claimant's claim was dismissed, but rather because the
claimant was made to pay the defendant's procedural ex-
penses due to the dismissal of the claim (Filippov, 2011a,
2011b).5
The article seeks answers to the aforementioned
questions by way of comparative analysis. The reference
material consists of the Estonian Law of Obligations Act,
the law of delict provisions of the Draft Common Frame of
Reference (DCFR, 2009),6 the Principles of European Tort
Law (PETL, 2005)7 and the legislation of both the German
Federal Republic and England. The authors decided to
compare Estonian tort law with the DCFR and the PETL
because these model laws represent the best reflection of
contemporary approaches to the field of European tort law.
The German and English approaches to law demonstrate
how two large Member States of the European Union
which belong to different legal families view the issue.
German law is chosen for comparison also because of BGB
being one of the most important source for Estonian leg-
islation in the field of delictual liability and other fields of
law (Varul, 2000). It should be added that in this article
only Estonian case-law is analysed exhaustively.
Also, this article does not analyse aspects relating to the
scale of non-pecuniary damage, which forms a complex
field in its own right. It should also be borne in mind that
one can speak of a claim for compensation of non-pe-
cuniary damage of a person close to the direct victim only
if the tortfeasor is liable for causing the death of or injury
to the victim. The article does not discuss the respective
general prerequisites of liability. The object of examination
is the specific prerequisites for a claim by a person close to
the direct victim. If the direct victim does not die im-
mediately after the injuring event, the victim has a claim
for compensation of non-pecuniary damage (Art.134 (2) of
the LOA), which may transfer to the victim's successors.
The article does not focus on this particular topic either.5 The described compensation case was covered by all major Esto-
nian newspapers and news portals. The topic was also covered, for in-
stance, by the Postimees daily newspaper on 15 February 2012 and on 10
April 2012. The popular national current affairs and investigative jour-
nalism programme Pealtnägija also made an episode about the case.
6 The DCFR was prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil
Code. The role of the DCFR is to serve as a model law that can be used in
preparing national and EU legislation
7 The PETL was proposed as a comprehensive system for tortious
liability. It also serves as a guideline for national and EU legislators.2. On the possibility of compensation of non-pecuniary
damage to a close person in general
R. Zimmermann has noted in a book on the practice of
the law of delict in European countries that answers to the
questions of whether and when persons close to the initial
victim receive compensation for non-pecuniary damage
differ considerably in European countries (Zimmermann,
2011, p. 712; von Bar, 2009a, 2009b, p. 395). In commen-
tary to the PETL it has been noted that most European legal
systems allow for such compensation of damage in the
event of the death of the direct victim (Rogers, 2005).
The Article 2:202 (1) of the DCFR states that non-eco-
nomic loss caused to a natural person as a result of another's
personal injury or death is legally relevant damage if at the
time of injury that person is in a particularly close personal
relationship to the injured person. C. von Bar has argued that
damage must be compensated to those especially close to
the victim for their mental suffering even if the suffering
does not lead to a medical condition (Zimmermann, 2011;
von Bar, 2009a, 2009b, p. 390). The purpose of the rule is not
to enrich those close to the victim, but stems from the rea-
lisation that a considerable reduction in a person's joie de
vivre (due to the loss or injury of a person close to them)
deserves compensation (von Bar, 2009a, 2009b, p. 391).
The third sentence of the PETL Article 10:301 (1) states
that non-pecuniary damage can also be the subject of
compensation for persons having a close relationship with
a victim suffering a fatal or very serious non-fatal injury.
There are no provisions analogous to those given by the
DCFR and the PETL in German law. It has been said that the
death of a person does not constitute a violation of a legal
right that leads to the obligation to compensate non-pe-
cuniary damage. Thus, the BGB does not allow for com-
pensation in the event of causing the death of a close
person (Oetker, 2012, Rn 28). This is justified by the fact
that the required elements of liability are not fully there
for a close person, because their personal legal right has
not been breached (Oetker, 2012, Rn 35).
At the same time, German law allows for a claim for the
compensation of non-pecuniary damage of a family
member (Angehörige) if the death of a close person has led
to the harming of a legal right of the family member
(Oetker, 2012, Rn 28; Spindler, Rn 12). Thus, it must be
assessed whether the health of the close person has been
damaged as a result of damage to the direct victim. If so,
the liability of the tortfeasor for causing the damage must
be assessed based on general rules (above all, based on §
823 (1) of the BGB) (Oetker, 2012, Rn 35). The prerequisite
for the obligation to compensate damage is not that the
tortfeasor has interfered with the legal rights of a family
member as the claimant. The tortfeasor may be liable for
the psychical reaction of a third party (‘shock damage’ or
Schockschaden). The prerequisite for the compensation
thereof is that the third party suffered medically identifi-
able health damage due to shock (Oetker, 2012, Rn 149–
150; Mäsch, 2015, p. 748).
In England, close relatives are entitled to compensation
in the event of the victim's death. Under Section 1A8(2) of
the Fatal Accidents Act (1976), those entitled to claim
compensation include the spouse, the registered partner
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the time of death. Compensation is awarded as a fixed sum
(approximately 16 450 euros, 1 A(3)), which is divided if
multiple persons are entitled to the compensation (van
Dam, 2006, 329–330).8
Unlike in the German BGB, the Estonian LOA contains a
provision similar to the aforementioned provisions of the
DCFR and PETL. Under the Article 134(3) of the LOA, in the
case of an obligation to compensate for damage arising
from the death of a person or a serious bodily injury or
health damage caused to the person, those close to the
deceased or to the aggrieved person may also claim com-
pensation for non-pecuniary damage if the payment of such
compensation is justified by exceptional circumstances.
All in all, provided that the respective prerequisites are
fulfilled, the compensation of non-pecuniary damage to
persons close to the victim is, in principle, considered
possible in all of the sources serving as the basis for the
comparison bar the German BGB. Under German law, the
realisation of a respective claim calls for the suffering of
health damage by a person close to the direct victim. Thus,
in the context of the BGB, it is not entirely correct to speak
of compensation of non-pecuniary damage to persons
close to the victim, because the compensation is not jus-
tified by the harming of the direct victim as such, i.e. non-
pecuniary damage arising from health damage caused to a
close person is compensated.
It should be added that there are considerable differ-
ences regarding the prerequisites of enforcing the claim
even in the sources of comparison that in principle affirm a
close person's claim for non-pecuniary compensation.
Next, a closer look is taken at specific prerequisites9
whereby a close person can claim compensation of non-
pecuniary damage from the tortfeasor.(footnote continued)
not generate a great deal of debate. However, the matter that sparked a
dispute was whether a close person should also be entitled to compen-
sation in the case of a personal injury of the victim.
11 It should be added that under the LOA the tortfeasor may be liable
for the death or personal injury of a person based on the general delictual
liability (Art. 1043 et seq of the LOA), strict liability (Art. 1056 et seq of the
LOA) or product liability provisions (Art. 1060 et seq of the LOA). Liability
under contract law is also an option. In the latter event one must take
account of the Art. 134 (1) of the LOA, which states that compensation for3. Prerequisites for compensating a close person for
non-pecuniary damage
3.1. Death or personal injury
The primary prerequisite for enforcing a close person's
claim for compensation of non-pecuniary damage is that a
legal right of the direct victim has been interfered with.
Under Article 2:202 (1) of the DCFR the prerequisite is the
direct victim's death or personal injury.
The PETL is stricter in this regard: under Article 10:301
(1), the victim's claim for compensation of non-pecuniary
damage is possible in the event of the victim's death or
very serious non-fatal injury. However, no attempts to
define ‘very serious non-fatal injury’ have been made
(Rogers, 2005, pp. 173,175).108 As of 1 April 2013, the amount of the bereavement claim award
increased from d11,800 to d12,980.
9 As noted in the introduction, this article does not analyse the lia-
bility of the tortfeasor towards the direct victim, which is simultaneously
nevertheless the primary general prerequisite for a non-pecuniary com-
pensation claim by a person close to the direct victim.
10 It should be added that when drafting the PETL a close person's
entitlement to compensation in the event of the death of the victim didIn Germany, compensation for Schockschaden is possi-
ble in the event of the death of or serious personal injury
to a person (Oetker, 2012, Rn 154). W.V.H. Rogers finds that
supporting the idea of compensating persons close to the
victim for non-pecuniary damage is less disputable in the
event of the victim's death (Rogers, 2001, p. 263). Thus, the
English Fatal Accidents Act (1976) only allows for non-
pecuniary damage claims by persons close to the victim in
the event of the victim's death.
Under the Article 134 (3) of the LOA, the primary pre-
requisite for a close person's claim is the causing of the
death of the person or the causing of a serious personal
injury or health damage to a person for which the tort-
feasor is liable.11
As emerges from the aforementioned, the strictest
legislation regarding the prerequisite can be found in
English law where only the death of the victim entitles
persons close to the victim to compensation. At the same
time, a personal injury is sufficient for bringing a claim
under the DCFR. The LOA is between the two in terms of
strictness. It should be added that the characteristics of the
deceased or injured person should not play any role as
regards a claim of a close person. Thus, the Estonian Su-
preme Court has held with reason12 that “the character-
istics of the deceased are of no relevance from the point of
view of application of the Article 134 (3) of the LOA.
Therefore, discussions over whether the deceased was a
person who spent most of their time on the Internet,
whether the victims could expect to be maintained by the
person in the future or whether such an expectation was
unfounded, given the habits of the victim, are irrelevant.
Upon the occurrence of exceptional circumstances, per-
sons close to young and economically successful people as
well as persons close to older and financially less well-off
people can rely on the Article 134 (3) of the LOA”.
It is not easy to answer the question of whether only
the death of a direct victim or also their personal injury
should justify a claim by a person close to the victim for
compensation of non-proprietary damage. Several argu-
ments can be made in support of both approaches. On the
one hand, one could argue that the victim's non-lethal
personal injury may cause even greater suffering tonon-pecuniary damage arising from non-performance of a contractual
obligation may only be claimed if the purpose of the obligation was to
pursue a non-pecuniary interest and, under the circumstances relating to
the conclusion of the contract or to the non-performance, the obligor was
aware or should have been aware that non-performance could cause
non-pecuniary damage.
12 Judgment of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of 27
October 2010 in case no. 3-1-1–57-10. In the given case, the parents of
the deceased demanded that the persons who killed their son compen-
sate non-pecuniary damage.
13 The judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of 9 April
2008 in case no. 3-2-1–19-08. According to the facts of the case: The
defendant's employee (a coach driver) caused a road accident in which a
coach collided with a van driven by the claimant's husband. The clai-
mant's husband died of his injuries. The claimant argued that she suf-
fered emotional and psychological distress as a result of her husband's
death, and that her constitutional right to the inviolability of family life
had been breached. She also argued that she was entitled to non-pe-
cuniary damages under Article 134 (3) of the LOA. In the claim, she re-
quested that the defendant be ordered to pay compensation of approxi-
mately 64 000 euros for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by her.
14 Judgment of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of 27
October 2010 in case no. 3-1-1–57-10.
J. Lahe, I. Kull / International Comparative Jurisprudence 2 (2016) 1–74persons close to the victim and affect their family life even
more than the death of the direct victim, which results in
one-off suffering and grief (Rogers, 2001, p. 263).
However, the payment of compensation in the case of a
personal injury to the direct victim conflicts with the fact
that in the case of a non-lethal personal injury the direct
victim has a claim for compensation of non-pecuniary
damage (Rogers, 2001, 263). It can also be argued that if
such claims by close persons were allowed, they would
cause uncertainty and complicate even the simplest claims
(Rogers, 2001, 264).
In spite of the aforementioned, the authors of this ar-
ticle do not consider it wise to preclude close persons’
claims in the case of a serious personal injury to the direct
victim. This allows for a case-by-case approach whereby
the court can assess the severity of the personal injury to
the direct victim in each individual case. Furthermore, it is
relatively easy to formulate reasonable boundaries in case
law in terms of when a personal injury is sufficiently ser-
ious to justify a close person's claim for non-pecuniary
damage. From the point of view of legal certainty it is very
important that subjects of law are aware of these bound-
aries. For instance, if the direct victim is in a coma for a
long time, more flexible legislation would allow for re-
sponding thereto by awarding compensation to those close
to the victim. Flexible legislation would also allow for not
awarding compensation, for instance, in the case of a leg
fracture, which is essentially also a serious personal injury.
3.2. Close relationship between the deceased or the ag-
grieved person and the person seeking compensation for non-
pecuniary damage
In the event of the death of or personal injury to the
direct victim, the circle of persons entitled to the com-
pensation of non-pecuniary damage is and must be lim-
ited. Usually, there must be a close relationship between
the victim and the claimant in order to enforce the claim.
Thus, it follows from DCFR Article 2:202 (1) that only
persons who had a particularly close personal relationship
to the direct victim can be entitled subjects. Such a re-
lationship may be based on formal criteria (spouse, chil-
dren, parents), but there may also be a de facto close re-
lationship (step-parent, cohabitee) (von Bar, 2009a, 2009b,
p. 391). A person who was only close to the aggrieved
person in terms of business (not personally) cannot usually
claim compensation for non-pecuniary damage. A claim by
such persons is only conceivable if the victimwas killed for
the very purpose of causing damage to the other person
(von Bar, 2009a, 2009b, p. 389).
The PETL seems to be formally more lenient than the
DCFR regarding this particular prerequisite: a person that
had a close relationship to the victim can claim compen-
sation for non-pecuniary damage (PETL Art 10:301 (1)).
The PETL does not attempt to give a list of persons who
could claim compensation for damage (Rogers, 2005, p.
175). In German case-law, the possibility of compensation
for shock damage has also typically been denied in cases of
persons other than close persons. At the same time, the
term ‘family members’ (Angehörige) cannot be sub-
stantiated solely in the sense of family law and mayinclude, for instance, engaged persons (Oetker, 2012, Rn
153).
In England, closer relatives are also entitled to com-
pensation. Under Section 1A8(2) of the Fatal Accidents Act
(1976), those entitled to claim compensation include the
spouse, the registered partner and the parents of a minor if
the minor had not married by the time of death.
Under the Article 134 (3) of the LOA, only persons close to
the direct victim are entitled to compensation of non-pe-
cuniary damage. Such a definition allows for flexibly deli-
miting the circle of persons entitled to compensation, but it
may give rise to excessive legal uncertainty without suffi-
cient case-law. In its first judgment13 on the application of
the Article 134 (3) of the LOA, the Civil Chamber of the Su-
preme Court noted the following: “the Law of Obligations Act
does not define ‘close persons’, which leaves the definition
up to the courts. The Supreme Court takes the view that
there is no common or uniform definition of ‘close persons’,
but each case should be assessed individually, based (among
other things) on the relations, family ties and living ar-
rangements of the persons, as well as other circumstances.
Certain persons, such as the spouse and children who lived
with the deceased, are undoubtedly included in the circle of
close persons”. Also, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme
Court has held that parents, for instance, can usually be
considered persons close to the child.14
On the whole, there is no doubt that the circle of per-
sons entitled to compensation must somehow be limited.
At first glance, the approach taken in English law – where
persons entitled to compensation are specifically defined –
may seem quite appealing: only the existence of a re-
lationship (not the extent of, for instance, grief) is im-
portant. If we add the fact that compensation is only paid
in the event of the death of the direct victim and as a fixed
sum, the English system can be deemed elegantly simple
and clear or, as Rogers (2001, p. 265) puts it, ‘effective’.
Thus, one inevitably comes to the question of whether
and to what extent we can give preference to legal cer-
tainty over justice arising from flexibility on the scale of
values. According to the authors of the model laws dis-
cussed in this article and according to the Law of Obliga-
tions Act, flexibility certainly outweighs legal certainty in
the given matter.
The PETL and the Law of Obligations Act try to achieve
flexibility using the term ‘close persons’, while in the DCFR
the prerequisite for a claim is a particularly close personal
relationship. According to German law, Angehörige are
entitled to damages for shock.
15 It should be noted that it is the person who directly witnesses the
event that causes their shock rather than a person who experiences it by
way of mediation is entitled to damages under German law as well.
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used in the LOA reasonable, but it nevertheless remains
vague without relevant case law. For example, based on
the case law generated in the more than 12-year period
that the LOA has been in force, one can only say with
certainty that the spouse and children qualify as close
persons. Other persons can merely guess as to whether
they qualify as close persons in the opinion of the courts.
Drawing analogy with a contract of health care services,
persons related to an aggrieved person may be understood
also as parents, sisters and brothers, unmarried partner, as
well as other persons close to the patient, if this arises
from the patients living arrangements. The court has the
discretion to identify the level of closeness and nature of a
relationship in the case of each dispute (Kingisepp, 2003,
p, 208; Zinnen et al., 2003).
By and large, one can agree with Cees van Dam's po-
sition that formal family relationships should not be the
unconditional prerequisite for compensation. From the
point of view of the severity of loss there is no difference
whether a married or a non-married person loses their
partner (van Dam, 2006, p. 311).
3.3. Exceptional circumstances
While the prerequisites for a claim discussed so far are
broadly similar in the DCFR, the PETL and the Law of Ob-
ligations Act (which cannot be said for the English and
German approaches), the Article 134 (3) of the LOA sets
out another prerequisite for the compensation of a close
person's non-pecuniary damage. In fact, a close person can
only enforce their claim if the payment of compensation is
justified by exceptional circumstances (Lahe, 2011, p. 283;
Lahe & Kull 2009). This additional prerequisite makes the
scope of application of the much narrower in comparison
with Article 134 (3) of the LOA, Article 2:202 (1) of the
DCFR and Article 10:301 (1) of the PETL.
For the first time, the Supreme Court explained the
substance of the exceptional circumstances as a pre-
requisite for bringing a claim in its judgment in case no.
3-2-1–19-08 of April 9 2008. In the judgment, the court
held that the causing of death or a serious bodily injury
cannot constitute an ‘exceptional circumstance’ within the
meaning of the Article 134 (3) of the LOA, but that there
must be additional circumstances justifying pecuniary
compensation. The loss of a close person in the abstract
sense – mourning and the pain of loss which inevitably
occur to a greater or lesser extent upon the death of every
close person – do not constitute an exceptional circum-
stance. Neither can the loss of family and a decline in the
quality of life, as argued by the claimant, constitute such a
circumstance. These circumstances often accompany the
loss of a close person.
In the given judgement, the Supreme Court also ex-
plained when the court finds that the criterion of excep-
tional circumstances has been fulfilled. According to the
Civil Chamber, a claim for compensation of damage suf-
fered by a close person under the Article 134 (3) of the LOA
would be justified particularly by the spatial closeness of
the close person to the deceased or seriously injured per-
son at the time of the damage, e.g. being in the same car atthe time of the accident or immediately observing the
accident or its consequences (being in the same ‘danger
zone’), as well as subsequent suffering caused by witnes-
sing the injury or the suffering of the deceased or seriously
injured close person (Oetker, 2012, Rn 153).15 The court
adds that such circumstances are constituted by an actual
wish to attack or influence persons close to the aggrieved
person, as well as the special circumstances of the damage,
such as the tortfeasor's intention to cause damage to the
victim in combination with the subsequent suffering of the
close persons. It should be noted that it in German law it is
the person who directly witnesses the event that causes
their shock rather than a person who experiences it
for example by the media (tragic news reported in TV)
is entitled to damages. However, these persons cannot
be simply bystanders (BGH 22.05.2007, VI ZR 17/06,
NJW 2007, 2764-2766). There shall be also closeness
to the victim to justify the compensation (Wuensch, 2009,
p. 21).
Since this judgment, Estonian civil courts have quite
accurately followed the Supreme Court's substantiation of
exceptional circumstances. As a result thereof the clai-
mants’ claims have usually been denied under the Article
134 (3) of the LOA due to the absence of exceptional cir-
cumstances. This conclusion does fully apply to the case-
law of criminal courts. Based on an analysis of case-law
(Vutt, 2012a, 2012b), one could draw the conclusion that
criminal courts grant claimants’ claims under the Article
134 (3) of the LOA more readily than civil courts. For in-
stance, in its judgment in criminal case no. 1-09-3573 of 17
March 2010, Harju County Court ordered the defendant to
pay damages amounting to 25,564 euros in a case where
the claimant suffered a serious injury and the claimant's
spouse died in a traffic accident. The claimant sat next to
their spouse in the car involved in the traffic accident and
witnessed the death of their spouse. Similarly, by the
judgment of 16 November 2010 in criminal case no. 1-10-
350, Tallinn Circuit Court awarded non-pecuniary damages
to the claimants, more specifically 12,782 euros to each, in
a case where the intoxicated defendant caused the death
of two persons who had been riding a bike on the road.
The authors note that while, given the circumstances of
the judgment of Harju County Court of 17 March 2010, the
claim would most probably have also been granted in a
civil court, this would probably not have been so based on
the circumstances of the judgment of Tallinn Circuit Court
of 16 November 2010, because in the case of the latter
accident there were no exceptional circumstances as de-
scribed in Supreme Court judgment no. 3-2-1–19-08.
Harju County Court refused to grant the claimants' claim
under the Article 134 (3) of the LOA in a situation where
the defendant organised a kayaking marathon in which
the claimant's mother and father took part. Their kayak
overturned in rough seas, they fell into the cold water and
died. The court held that since the claimants were not
spatially close to their parents at the time of their death,
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claimants were not fulfilled.16
Likewise, the claimant's claim for non-pecuniary da-
mages was denied under the Article 134 (3) of the LOA in
the case17 highlighted in the introduction to the article,
which sparked broad-ranging debate and involved a si-
tuation where the defendant, who did not have the right to
drive a vehicle unsupervised, caused a traffic accident that
resulted in the death of three people, including both par-
ents of the claimant. The claimant argued that in the
present case the causing of the death of both parents of
the claimant by a criminal offence of the defendant, the
inhuman distortion of the parents’ appearance in a brutal
manner and the direct and repeated witnessing of such a
sight by the claimant (from photos in the file of the
criminal case) and the consolidation thereof in the clai-
mant's memory constitute exceptional circumstances for
the purposes of the Article 134 (3) of the LOA. The circuit
court took the view that the requirement of exceptional
circumstances was not fulfilled in the given case. The court
noted that the fact that the claimant's parents were killed
due to the defendant's criminal act was not sufficient
grounds for granting the claim for non-pecuniary da-
mages. The Supreme Court rejected the claimant's appeal
in cassation.
The two latter cases vividly illustrate that the condition
of exceptional circumstances contained in the Article 134
(3) of the LOA and the substantiation of the condition by
the Supreme Court have resulted in a situation where
persons close to the direct victim cannot claim compen-
sation for non-pecuniary damage. It is clear that cases
considered exceptional by the Supreme Court occur ex-
tremely rarely in real life. Therefore, one could ask whe-
ther the Supreme Court has not excessively limited the
possibilities of a claim by close persons (Kingisepp, 2003,
p. 208). Keeping the aforementioned court cases in mind,
it may even seem unfair that the claimants were even
deprived of compensation in the event of the simultaneous
death of both parents, because the courts did not find the
cases to be exceptional.
Based on the aforementioned it can be argued that due to
the narrow substantiation of exceptional circumstances by
the Supreme Court the possibilities of a person close to the
direct victim to obtain compensation for non-pecuniary da-
mage are far more limited than under the PETL, the DCFR or
English law. It cannot be precluded that, essentially, persons
close to the direct victim are in quite a similar position in
Estonia and Germany (as regards compensation of non-pe-
cuniary damage): while under German law only Schockscha-
den is compensated, the aggrieved person usually cannot
truly enforce their claim in Estonia either.1816 Judgment of Harju County Court of 10 October 2010 in case no.
2-10-55812.
17 Judgment of Tallinn Circuit Court of 22 March 2011 in civil case no.
2-10-779.
18 In Germany the draft law from 2.02.2015 was published for dis-
cussion concerning the classification of close persons. Proposal provides
that BGB § 844 shall be amended by BGB § 844a. Under the new BGB §
844a Section 2 close persons are, under certain circumstances, spouses
and registered life partners, and, under any circumstances, parents and
children.The authors of this article find that the Supreme Court
should consider the alleviation of exceptional circumstances
as the criteria of the prerequisite for a claim for non-pe-
cuniary damages. On the one hand, the Article 134 (3) of the
LOA largely becomes meaningless if the prerequisites for the
application thereof are only fulfilled in extremely rare events.
On the other hand, broader substantiation of exceptional
circumstances would help to make Article 134 (3) of the LOA
closer to the DCFR and the PETL, where the given additional
prerequisite does not exist for a close person's claim. Alter-
natively, the legislature could consider the elimination of the
exceptional circumstances requirement from the Article 134
(3) of the LOA. This solution would obviously call for a con-
servative approach by Estonian courts upon deciding the
amount of damages.4. Conclusions
Issues pertaining to the compensation of a person close
to the victim for non-pecuniary damage are multifaceted
and disputable. Although based on the sources of com-
parison used in this article one can conclude that, in
general, the awarding of non-pecuniary damages to a
person close to the direct victim is upheld, the established
prerequisites for a respective claim of a close person are
quite different.
It can be argued that not only the death of the direct
victim (as is the case of English law) should constitute the
event following which there is reason to speak of a close
person's claim for non-pecuniary damages. Under the
PETL, the DCFR and the Law of Obligations Act, a (serious)
personal injury to the direct victim is sufficient as well.
It is problematic to delimit the circle of persons who, in
principle, could be entitled to compensation. With the
exception of the English Fatal Accidents Act, the matter is
not specifically defined in the instruments analysed. This
solution can be supported, because it allows for flexibly
assessing the close relationship between the direct victim
and the claimant. However, describing the substance of the
definition of close persons is important in case-law so that
a potential claimant can assess, before filing a claim,
whether they qualify as a close person.
In Estonia, the possibility of realisation of a claim for
non-pecuniary damages by a close person is put in a dif-
ferent light by the additional prerequisite of exceptional
circumstances arising from the Article 134 (3) of the LOA.
Narrow substantiation of these exceptional circumstances
by the Estonian Supreme Court has created a situation
where a close person can only obtain real damages in rare
individual events. In essence, this means that the Law of
Obligations Act considerably differs from the PETL and the
DCFR (a well as from English law) in this regard. It cannot
be precluded that in reality it is as difficult for a person
close to the victim to receive damages under the LOA as it
is to receive damages for shock under German law.(footnote continued)
See more on: http://www.justiz.bayern.de/media/pdf/gesetze/ge
setzentwurf_angehoerigenschmerzensgeld.pdf.
J. Lahe, I. Kull / International Comparative Jurisprudence 2 (2016) 1–7 7On the whole, one can take the view that, even though
the English system may seem tempting as regards a claim
of persons close to the victim for being so simple and
clearly defined, flexibility and the chance of making a fair
decision in an individual case still outweigh legal certainty
in the matter at hand. The authors find that the Supreme
Court should consider revising its position (in case no. 3-2-
1–19-08) in substantiating exceptional circumstances. The
declaration arising from Article 134 (3) of the LOA, ac-
cording to which persons close to the direct victim have
the right to claim non-pecuniary damages, is misleading,
because the respective rule is almost never applied.References
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